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Abstract—A smart grid is an advanced method for supplying
electricity to the consumers alleviating the limitations of the
existing system. It causes frequent meter reading transmission
from the end-user to the supplier. This frequent data transmission
poses privacy risks. Several works have been proposed to solve
this problem but cannot ensure privacy at the optimal level.
This work is based on a distributed trust-based data aggregation
system leveraging a secret sharing mechanism. In this work, we
show that three aggregators are enough for ensuring consumer’s
privacy in a distributed trust-based system. We leverage the
idea of anonymity in our research and show that neither an
active attacker nor a passive attacker can breach consumer’s
privacy. We show proof of our concept mathematically and in
a cryptographic game based mechanism. We name our new
proposed system “Distributed Trust Based Anonymous System
(DTBAS)”.
Keywords—Smart Grid, Smart Meter, Privacy, Anonymity,
Secret Sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present scenario of electricity supply, meter reading,
and consumer service is not as advanced as it could be. To
make the supply of electricity more advanced, smart grid is
proposed. Unlike current electric grid system in which meter
reading is accomplished bi-weekly or monthly basis, smart
grid suggests frequent data transmission (i.e. 15-minutes of
interval) from the meters to the utility. The objectives behind
this proposition are to provide better service to the consumer,
solve problem rapidly, managing the supply and use of the
smart grid more efficiently [1].
There are several benefits of introducing smart grid. It can
ensure sustainability and reduce carbon dioxide [2]. As smart
meters will provide the electricity usage details frequently,
it can motivate the users to reduce their consumption and
minimize their utility cost. On the supplier side, it can help
electric supplier to introduce dynamic pricing mechanisms [3].
Like all the technical advancements, this advancement also
depicts some challenges.
As smart meter increases the flow of customer daily electric-
ity usage data precisely to the electricity supplier, it introduces
privacy challenge. If the supplier is malicious, or any other
party gets those precise personal data, the client’s privacy is
Fig. 1: Data Aggregation Model in Smart Grid.
breached. An attacker can know when the client is home, and
she can plan for targeted attack. The clients fall into the risk of
targeted marketing too. To cope with these problems, several
researches have been published to protect user’s privacy by
aggregating data based on different cryptography protocols [4]
[5][6][7][8].
The core model is to collect the meter reading data in the
aggregators and send the aggregated data to the supplier. The
purpose is to obscure the direct raw data transmission from the
client to the supplier (Figure-1). The existing cryptography
based models cannot ensure complete trust in the process
of data transmission. The cryptography based protocols are
acceptable to data transmission. However, it cannot ensure the
protection of complete privacy. The distributed trust is more
secure than trust in a single system. Hence, distributing the
smart meter data into multiple aggregators may enhance the
privacy. But there is no previous work that answered how many
aggregators can be enough to distribute the trust. Though some
research proposes more than two aggregators [9]. However, in
the distributed trust mechanisms using secret sharing, it is yet
to know the optimized number of aggregators.
In this work, we show that three aggregators are enough
for a distributed trust based system. And three aggregators
are enough to protect user’s privacy. In our proposed system,
the number of aggregators cannot be less than three and the
number of users cannot be less than three too. A supplier
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can increase the number of aggregators if the capacity of
the aggregators is overloaded. We leverage the concept of
anonymity in a system [10].
In anonymity literature, there has been different mechanisms
to ensure data anonymity and connection anonymity [10]. Data
anonymity means the actual data that are being transferred
and the connection anonymity means to make the sender of
the data anonymous. Interestingly, in our proposed distributed
trust based anonymous system, we can ensure both data
and connection anonymity. We can measure the degree of
anonymity based on the power of an attacker. For example,
how much data an attacker can gather and how much an
attacker can know from the collected traffic or data. When
the degree of anonymity is one, all the users of our system
being the originator of the sent data have equal probability.
Claudia et. al. [10] used Shanon’s definition of entropy [11] to
quantify the degree of anonymity. We take the same method to
measure the degree of anonymity in our proposed system. As
anonymity is measured considering the power of an attacker.
We consider both active and passive attacker. We will give a
detail description of those two attack scenarios in section-4.1.
We provide a mathematical proof of our proposed system in
section-5.
We also provide proof of our proposed system in a cryp-
tographic game based privacy metric proposed by Bohli et.
al. [2]. Niklas et. al. [9] used this approach in their work to
measure the privacy. In this approach, the privacy is measured
by the disadvantage of an attacker to distinguish between
two users. The game is based on two parties: the adversary
and the challenger. The success of the adversary depends on
successfully identifying the user from a set of users that the
challenger provides. We give the detail description in Section-
IV-D.
II. RELATED WORK
The breach of privacy because of the frequent meter data
transmission is not desirable by any client. It can reveal
information about a client’s family, electricity usage pattern,
and also specific-time information about a client which are
certainly scary [12]. For example, Alice is watching HBO
at 10.00PM. Some research has proposed client’s privacy
protection through anonymous data communication from the
smart meter to the supplier.
Pan et al. proposes an aggregation scheme eliminating the
need for a TTP and dividing the users into various groups [5].
They leveraged the chinese remainder theorem and paillier key
encryption (PKE) scheme to design their system. However,
they still do not answer the question of how many aggregator
we need. Engel and Eibl propose an approach called Wavelet-
based multi-resolution that is based on combining multiple
resolutions and direct user control for smart meter (SM)
[13]. In this system, aggregators collect encrypted real time
SM readings from individual users relying on distribution
operators (Wavelet Encryption). Silva et al. tries to solve
the limitations to ensure SM privacy using Intel SGX SDK
[14]. They conclude that Intel SGX can provide simple and
general solution for SM privacy problem. However, they tend
to make the communication stronger in different cryptographic
mechanism but fail to provide solution of the quest how many
aggregators can be best for the communication purpose.
It has been also a challenge to measure the privacy with
a standard privacy metrics. Buescher et al. [9] measure the
privacy based on Bohli et al.’s [2] proposed approach that is
based on cryptographic game. Though their privacy metric is
widely used, to make their system work, it requires a lot of
users (i.e. 4,50,000). Hence, we are not adopting that metric.
A. Anonymity in the Smart Grid
Many researches have conducted to study the privacy of
the smart meters by anonymizing consumers consumption
data. A study conducted by Efthymiou and Kalogridis [15],
they proposed a system that anonymizes metering data that
sent by smart meters which are utility consumption data or
operational data. They applied two different identifiers, low
frequency identifier for sending utility bills or operational
purposes, and high frequency identifier for specific locations
data. High frequency identifier is authenticating by third party
escrow service to make it difficult to associate it with specific
SM or costumer.
But they require the presence of a trusted third party (TTP)
in the system. However, TTP is not a sustainable solution as
it can increase the system complexity [5] and be a malicious
entity too. Hence, we aim to alleviate the need to a trusted
third part. Instead aggregation based mechanism can be more
secure and enhance the privacy without being dependent on
the TTP. In this mechanism, the smart meters communicate
encrypted data to each other before going for the aggregation
[8].
Another study done by Ford et al. [16], they proposed
a protocol which is stored all data in Trusted Third Party
(TTP). (TTP) acts as anonymous identifier that responsible
for analyzing and computing usage data, and utility provider
request billing information and some final result from (TTP),
which means the data is divided between (TTP) and utility
provider. So, no one of them has a full record of the consumers
usage data. This schema is centralized on (TTP), and it is
vulnerable to single point failure. Moreover, if the (TTP)
gets compromised or they change the amount of data that
they provide it to the utility provider, consumers privacy gets
violated.
B. Secret Sharing
There are many ways to prevent secret to be discovered,
one is to divide the secret into multiple shares which are
should be collected together to get the secret again. There
are a bunch of researchers conducted studies in this field.
A study done by Shamir [17] , it showing a system based
on polynomial interpolation by dividing the secret into a
number pieces in a way that it can be easy reconstruct from
any share pieces, but with uncompleted shares dont give any
information about the secret. Another study done by Asmuth
and Bloom [18], which is showing a scheme similar to Shamirs
2
scheme for reconstruction the secret, it relies on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem. While some studies are investigated
different aspects of secret sharing by studying the degree of
security to protect it against malicious attempts. Feldman [19]
has done an investigation about a protocol in verifiable secret
sharing (VSS), which is a cryptography tool for distributed
systems such as smart meters. Its basically guarantees that any
share can be verified in which secret is belonging to, against
any compromise of corruption by a malicious.
There is a study mentioned the privacy preserving of smart
meters using secret sharing scheme. Rottondi et al. [20] pro-
posed a framework that is responsible for protecting consumers
information by providing different levels of aggregations with-
out revealing for any party individual information by applying
Shamirs scheme in their framework. Moreover, they proposed
an infrastructure for collecting the data for each consumer
which is the Privacy Preserving Nodes (PPN). Its basically
relying secret sharing scheme, consumer info is the secret and
it needs to divide into shares and each (PPN) carrying a share
for a specific secret, then aggregate the shares to the system
according to each customer. The full information (the secret)
can be retrieved by collecting all shares from (PPN), the (PPN)
is acting as the aggregators.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
The intended focus of this project is to propose a distributed
trust based anonymous system (DTBAS) for smart grid’s data
aggregation. In this system, the optimal number of aggregators
proposed. Afterwards, we measure the degree of anonymity of
our proposed DTBAS. The strength of any proposed system
depends of the ability of that system to defend particular
attacks. We need to have a well-defined attack model that
we are aiming to defend. We are assuming the presence of
both active and passive attacker in our attack models. For
the purpose of trust based system, we are going to adopt
the secret sharing mechanism and 15-minutes interval of time
for the transmission of meter reading data. The cryptographic
mechanism to transmit data from the smart meters to the
aggregators is not the focus of this project. The readings of a
single smart meter in 15-minutes time interval will look like
(Table-I).
TABLE I: Smart Meter Readings in Distributed Trust based System
in 15-minutes time interval.
AG1 AG2 AG3 ..... AGn
15−mins t1 t11 t12 t13 ..... t1n
15−mins t2 t21 t22 t23 ..... t2n
45−mins t3 t31 t32 t33 ..... t3n
..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....
30− days tm tm1 tm2 tm3 ..... tmn
The reading of a time interval is divided into sub-reading.
As mentioned earlier, the secret sharing mechanism is intended
to be implemented in each of the sub-reading.
In this section, we provide the attack models, system model
and the measurement model of our proposed DTBAS.
A. Attack Model
As we are proposing an anonymous system, the degree of
anonymity is measured based on the power of an attacker
in a particular attack model. This proposed system may not
work in different attack models. Hence, a clear concept and
definition of the attack model is required. We are using the
same definition Diaz et. al. [10] used in their work with little
modification to define our active and passive attacker.
In our attack models (i.e. active and passive), the attacker
is capable of performing probabilistic attack. She can assign
probabilities of being the originator of data in a specific client.
This kind of attacks are known as probabilistic attack [21].
1) Active Attack: An attacker is said to be an active attacker
if she can exploit or control at least one clients of a system.
In other words, she can see the data that are passing through
the system and she can even prevent the client from sending
any data to the system.
However, in our anonymous data aggregation system, the
active attacker is assumed to have power to control or exploit
at least one or at best two aggregators. The attacker can
access the information received by those aggregators, but
cannot successfully identify what data belongs to which client
(Figure-2).
Fig. 2: Active Attack Model in DTBAS.
2) Passive Attack: We are adopting local-global attacker’s
definition of Diaz et. al. [10] as our passive attacker in our
proposed system. This kind of attacker can posses the control
of the entire systems.
In our anonymous data aggregation system, the passive
attacker is assumed to have the power to control the whole
aggregation systems. This attacker in this system can be the
supplier of the electricity. We can assume that, only the
supplier can have the power to access all the aggregators of
the proposed system (Figure-3).
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Fig. 3: Passive Attack Model in DTBAS.
B. System Model
We are proposing a distributed trust based anonymous
aggregation system (DTBAS) with only three aggregators. We
aim to achieve anonymity in our system through the split
of smart meter’s data into three aggregators (Figure-4). The
descriptions of the two parties of our system are given as
follows.
Fig. 4: Distributed Trust Based Anonymous Aggregation System
(DTBAS).
Senders (Smart Meters): Smart meters are the sender of
data to the aggregators. Smart meters are the entity of our
proposed system which anonymity we aim to protect. Smart
meters send data in 15-minutes time interval. Each smart
meter divides the reading data into three equal part and
then send different part to different aggregators. That means
each aggregator will get 1/3 of the whole meter reading data
(Figure-5) of a single smart meter which is also the major
concept of distributed trust based mechanism. By splitting
whole data into three splits, we are achieving anonymity along
with distributed trust.
Fig. 5: Data Transmission from Smart Meter to Aggregators.
Receivers (Aggregators): In our proposed system, the re-
ceiver are the aggregators that receive data from the smart
meters. The communication mechanism of the aggregators is
one-way. By one-way, we mean that it does not respond or
send back any data into the smart meters. The supplier directly
sends billing data to the smart meters (Figure-6). The aim is to
defend any correlation attack that an attacker can perform from
the aggregated data and the billing data. It might be possible
for an attacker to deanonymize the users by the correlation
attack. Our objective is to lower the severity of information
that an attacker might use to perform any kind of attack.
Fig. 6: Flow of Billing Data from the Supplier to the Smart Meters.
C. Measurement Model
As we are proposing an anonymous aggregation system, the
definition of the anonymity needs to well-defined. Given the
splits of data from the smart meters to the aggregators in our
system, the anonymity set will be the total number of users.
In the system, the total number of nodes will be the multiplied
result of the total number of users and the number of splits.
Let, n = Total Number of Users.
m = Number of Splits/Number of Aggregators.
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Hence, Anonymity Set = n
Total Number of Nodes in the System = m ∗ n
In this work, we aim to protect the anonymity of the smart
meters n which are the users. In our system, we considers
the users as honest. The definition of honest users is that the
attacker cannot exploit the behavior of the smart meters (i.e.
the smart meters cannot be malicious).
It is intuitive that the anonymity set must consists of
more than two users. Otherwise, an attacker can assign the
probability of 50% to each users. At the same time, the number
of splits or aggregators must be more than two. The splits are
the portion of data, an attacker will get 50% of the data. The
attacker will have greater advantage to analyze half of the
data to deanonymize an user. That is why we proposed three
aggregators in our system.
The number of Users > 2
The number of Aggregators > 2
1) Measuring Degree of Anonymity: The highest degree of
anonymity is calculated when an attacker can find out all the
users of an anonymity set and can assign probabilities to each
of the users. At the same time, the probabilities of the users
being the senders of the data are equal.
In our proposed system, the degree of anonymity does
not depend on the size of the anonymity set n. Rather, we
calculate the anonymity based on the information it can gain
and assign probabilities to the users as being the senders of
the information. The information an attacker can gain depends
on the number of splits or aggregators in our system. For
example, if the splits are three, an attacker can gain 33% of
information by exploiting an aggregator, and if the splits are
four, an attacker can gain 25% of information by exploiting
an aggregator. We are taking the same measurement formulas
Diaz et. al. [10] used in their work. The entropy H(ES) of
the system is calculated as Equation-1:
H(ES) = −
s∑
i=1
pi log2(pi) (1)
Here, ES = Entropy of the system.
s = Number of Splits.
The maximum entropy of our proposed system
H(MaxES) is measured as Equation-2:
H(MaxES) = log2(s) (2)
The degree of anonymity da of our system is measured as
Equation-3:
da = 1− H(MaxES)−H(ES)
H(MaxES)
(3)
All the users have the equal probability of being the senders
of data if and only if da = 1.
IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT
A. Computing Degree of Anonymity
We calculated the degree of anonymity with both equal
probability, Pi (Table-II) and variable probability (Table-III).
In equal probability, all the splits have the same probability.
In other words, the aggregator contains equal amount of
information. If an attacker can exploit a particular aggregator,
she cannot gain more than that in equal probability. We can see
from Table-II that aggregators equal to two or more are giving
us the degree of anonymity da = 1. But we cannot choose two
aggregators as we mentioned in our system model.
TABLE II: Degree of Anonymity with Equal Probability.
Number of
Pi H(ES) H(MaxES) daAggregator
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 None
2 0.5 -1.00 1.00 1.0
0.5
0.33
3 0.33 -1.58 1.58 1.0
0.33
0.25
4 0.25 -2.00 2.00 1.0
0.25
0.25
0.20
0.20
5 0.20 -2.32 2.32 1.0
0.20
0.20
TABLE III: Degree of Anonymity with Variable Probability.
Number of
Pi H(ES) H(MaxES) daAggregator
0.50
3 0.49 - 1.07 1.58 0.68
0.01
0.50
4 0.48 - 1.14 2.00 0.57
0.01
0.01
0.50
0.47
5 0.01 -1.21 2.32 0.52
0.01
0.01
In the variable probability, Pi (Table-III), we are assuming
that an attacker can assign random guess probability at least to
one aggregator (split) and then we assign probability in decre-
mental manner (i.e. 50%, 49%, 0.01%). The reasons behind
this method of assigning probability is that, we are giving the
attacker maximum power to know about the particular split. A
strong global level passive adversary (Figure-3) who can see
everything can assign probabilities in this way. We can see
from Table-III that the degree of anonymity da = 0.68 which
is the highest with three aggregators. The more we increase
the number of aggregators, the attacker gains more advantage.
The lower the degree of anonymity, the higher an attacker gain
advantage.
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TABLE IV: Information an Active Attacker can Gain in Active Attack Model.
AG1 AG2 AG3 SM
Data
SM1 SM11 SM12 SM13
∑3
i=1 SM1i
SM2 SM21 SM22 SM23
∑3
i=1 SM2i
SM3 SM31 SM32 SM33
∑3
i=1 SM3i
SM4 SM41 SM42 SM43
∑3
i=1 SM4i
..... ..... ..... ..... .....
SMn SMn1 SMn2 SMn3
∑3
i=1 SMni
AG
Data
∑n
i=1 SMn1
∑n
i=1 SMn2
∑n
i=1 SMn3
TABLE V: Probability of an User being the Originator of the data
Decreases as the Number of Users Increases.
Number of SM Probability (Puser)
2 0.50
3 0.33
4 0.25
5 0.20
6 0.17
..... .....
n 1/n
Observing the both cases to measure the degree of
anonymity, we are proposing that three aggregators are enough
for our proposed system. As in our active attack model, an at-
tacker cannot simultaneously exploit more than one aggregator.
Realistically she cannot even assign these high probability like
we are assigning. We are doing that to increase the power of an
attacker in our system and show that with this high probability
the attacker might fail.
B. Defended Active Attack
As defined in our active model in Section-III-A1 can exploit
or in control an aggregator and she can get the data that
is coming to this aggregator. The attacker can obtain the
accumulated blue marked information in Table-IV. If she
accumulates, she can see the blue marked accumulated data∑n
i=1 SMn1. To deanonymize the smartmeter1, the attacker
needs the accumulated data
∑n
i=1 SM1i. We can see from
Equation-4 that the information an attacker can gain is not
equal to the information she needs to deanonymize the smart
meter. Hence, we can say from this mathematical operation
that our defined active attack can be defended by our proposed
system.
n∑
i=1
SMn1 6=
n∑
i=1
SM1i (4)
Even if the active attacker can assign high probability in
a particular smart meter (maximum of random guess in our
model), she cannot gain the whole information because of the
distributed trust based aggregation system model. In addition
the number of users will be large number. That is why the
seeming advantage of an attacker is always lower than the
actual advantage.
Realistically, the probability of a smart meter (SM) being
the originator of a message will get decreased along with the
increase of the smart meters (Table-V).
C. Defended Passive Attack
As we have mentioned in Section-III-A2 that the passive
attacker have the power to control the whole aggregation
systems. This attacker in this system can be the supplier of
the electricity.
Intuitively, it is frightening that the authority is being thee
attacker. As the data is encrypted with complex cryptographic
mechanisms, she has to go through a long computational
process to decrypt the data (Table-IV). An attacker will need
a long time to decrypt the data and map to a specific smart
meter. Deanonymization of an user will not be fruitful after a
long period to perform an attack as the usage pattern may not
remain same after a long time.
D. Cryptographic Game
Cryptographic game based mechanism is used in the work
of Niklas et. al. [9]. They leveraged the approached of Bohli
et. al. [2] to measure the privacy.
In this mechanism, there are two parties: the adversary
and the challenger. The success of the adversary depends on
successfully identifying the user from a set of users that the
challenger provides.
Firstly, The adversary chooses two load profiles lf1 and lf2
and sends those to the challenger. The challenger then take one
of those load profiles and mixes with a set of load profiles
( lf1 / lf2 , l3 , l4 .....ln ). Afterwards, the challenger this
mixes to the adversary. If the adversary can distinguish the
from the load profile from the mixes, it is his success. Unless
otherwise it is failure.
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This process goes on for 5000 times and the probability
of success is calculated based on the number of times the
adversary can distinguish the load profile from the mixes.
However, in our anonymous aggregation system, the users
are of equal probability. In addition the data is of equal portion
in each aggregators. Hence, it is confusing for the adversary
to distinguish the user from the mixes as all will be of equal
probability.
V. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Though our proposed anonymous aggregation system model
is novel, we cannot say this system is practically imple-
mentable unless we experiment with real data and simulate
th actual results.
Hence, our future work is aimed to experiment this system
with real world electricity consumption data. In addition to
that, we aim to test in real world network traffic to cross-
validate our system.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we are proposing a distributed trust based
anonymous aggregation system (DTBAS) to send data from
the smart meters to the supplier. We are proposing that
three aggregators are enough for our proposed system. This
novel system model will solve the privacy problem of the
electricity users. We proof mathematically the effectiveness of
our proposed system in two well-defined attack models (i.e.
active attack and passive attack). We measured the degree of
anonymity based on the advantage an attacker can gain from
the information. We also give explanation of the effectiveness
of our model against cryptographic game based approach.
We aim to solve the limitations of our proposed system by
experimenting in real world dataset in future.
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